This is based on the principle that an adult of sound mind has a right to control what happens to him* 4. But what aspects of HIV testing are subject to this general principle of consent? A dispute about consent is resolved according either to the law of battery or to a conception of medical negligence. The law of battery is predicated on the idea that one party is the object of an unconsented and offensive or harmful touching by the other. Testing for HIV may require a special procedure but is more usually one of a series of tests on the same sample of blood. However, ethical constraints exist even when it does not involve a distinct procedure apart from taking blood for other purposes and suggests that it is not Just the physical act of testing that requires specific consent. The reason for consent must therefore depend on the social and personal consequences of the information gained. There is no doubt that there is a stigma attached to the diagnosis of HIV positivity or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). There is potential rejection from society, families, lovers, occupational associates and even health care staffS. Most of this discrimination is not only cruel but also rests on the false belief that AIDS is highly contagious. Cases of dismissal from employment, exclusion from school, social ostracization and so on are all documented". All '"Throughout the article, I have used 'him' and 'he' for convenience as the majority of AIDS patients are male. rest on spurious justifications based in misconceptions about the disease. These responses means that an HIV test result is of potentially serious import to the patient quite apart from its implications for his own well-being in the future. But it is clear that it is the result and not the act of taking the test that is at issue.
This implies that we must look at the concepts of care and negligence to see how we ought to assess the doctor's duties surrounding HIV antibody testing. The doctor is negligent if he performs a procedure about which the patient has insufficient information to be able to make a reasoned decisions. In the case of HIV testing we have seen that the relevant information concerns the consequences of a positive HIV test for the patient. These consequences emerge from certain facts about HIV and AIDS which are not themselves ethical issues but have a bearing on ethical concerns.
(1) HIV infection is transmitted by the inoculation of body fluids from an infected person.
(2) It seems overwhelmingly likely that most patients with HIV infection go on to develop AIDS.
(3) At present there is no known cure for AIDS although we are beginning to see the development of agents that may alter its course'>, Different individuals react to the facts about AIDS in different ways. It can cause one to 'amend one's sexual ways', make no change in sexual behaviour, get into a 'guilt/infection spiral', commit suicide or I develop an irresponsible fatalistic hedonism", Where such effects attend the discovery of a piece of information, there is no question that that information must be regarded as being of material concern to a reasonable person in the patient's position.
Thus it should be discussed with the patient before HIV testing. The patient who is at risk from AIDS often feels that he has little to gain and much to lose if he is tested and found to be HIV positive. There are few useful therapies and he is therefore faced with the knowledge of loss of his normal life expectancy. Indeed some insurance companies appear to weight a policy purely on the basis that a person has been tested, regardless of the result. Most companies regard the having of a test as a I trigger' response that allows identification of risk factors. (If these factors are then weighted according to actuarial methods one can hardly object to their inclusion, but an unjustified and discriminatory use of such information would clearly be objectionable.) We must therefore talk to the patient about the significance of the test result, his attitude to the information and to what he will tell others and the strategies he will use to cope with the information he might get. Kennedy remarks 'the consequences for a patient that flow from a positive HIV test (or in some instances even a negative test) are so serious for him that a court would consider it to be contrary to public policy to regard consent to testing as including a procedure with such far reaching implications for the patient'P. The gloomy consequences for an at-risk person have, however, been lightened a little recently because there are some suggestions that AZT may prevent or dela, progress from HIV infection to full-blown AIDS . This, of course, does nothing to dispel the obligation to inform patients about HIV tests and their implications before performing them.
What is more, the ethical worries are not completely avoided by having the test done but not telling the patient about the result because just knowing that somebody does know a fact about oneself that has such dire consequences is a significant thing for any person to have to live with.
Quite apart from the patient's own reactions, he is also faced with an unenviable choice in his relations with others. He can be honest and risk ostracization or deceitful and introduce a damaging element into close relationships he might form. These facts entail that a HIV test is subject to the constraints of consent that any comparably important medical intervention would be.
UNCONSENTED HIV TESTING
These ethical problems require us to be extremely careful about HIV testing where it is not requested by the patient. There are, however, situations where there is pressure to do unconsented tests.
The first, and most easily dealt with, is the pressure to identify HIV carriers 'in the public weal' . In general, we can say that HIV testing is not a public health measure. That is because normal members of the public going about their everyday business cannot inadvertently 'catch AIDS'. HIV is only transmitted in a circumscribed and reasonably avoidable (for most people) set of activities. What is more, there is a window of perhaps up to 14 months but at least a few weeks between infectivity and the development of HIV positive antibodies. This implies that a negative test at a given time is not relevant a few weeks later even if there has been no sexual contact or other potentially infecting incidents in the interim. Thus the idea that we can detect the 'dangerous' members of our society is both ill-grounded with respect to information about and control of the disease and unduly intrusive and harmful unlike other diseases where we can help the at-risk person. This may, of course, change if we find effective anti-viral agents for HIV or a vaccine to combat/protect against it. Even at the present state of the art it seems that there may be definite advantages in infected peo~le finding out before they develop clinical AIDS7, .
There are, however, a restricted range of circumstances where testing without consent might be justified.
THE HOSPITAL PATIENT
The first situation is the at-risk patient entering medical care. It is argued that staff are at increased risk from such a patient and ought to be able to demand a test as a precondition of treatment. There are 17 clearly documented cases in the world literature as at 1988. There are a range of reported incidence figures for infection of health care workers per needle stick injury from infected patients; the lowest is 0.1% and the highest 0.7%11. But the argument for mandatory patient testing is flawed because: (i) A negative test does not guarantee that the patient is not infective; and (ii) there is a general ethical requirement not to test without consent. To justify a test in the interest of not harming health care workers would counter the second problem but still not solve the first. For this reason the only logical way to respond to this situation is to treat each at-risk person as if they were HIV positive, ie to prevent needle stick/inoculation injuries (other infection control measures are unnecessary and irrational).
Three arguments can be levelled against this conclusion: (i) there are normal measures in place that are adequate for HIV patients; (ii) it is impossible reliably to detect those who are at-risk; and (iii) to take full precautions, 'on spec' as it were, would significantly affect efficient patient management. These arguments are used to support opposing stands but one of them is flawed. The first neglects the fact that high-risk surgery, eg with hepatitis B positive patients, is done differentlywith double gloves, careful attempts to avoid needle stick injuries and so on -and that this slows surgery and requires that some distinction between patients is necessary. The second argument is valid and constitutes a real problem. Thus the third argument succeeds because even though there is a small and sometimes identifiable at-risk group, it cannot always be detected with careful history-taking and physical examination so that the requisite precautions may not be taken without a positive test-result.
A further problem arises if a worker suffers a needle stick/inoculation injury while caring for an at-risk patient. In this case the definite hazard to the lives of the health worker and his or her sexual partner would seem to outweigh the harms associated with a test (the result of which need not be communicated to the at-risk patient). This is a case where we need to recognize a constraint of justice on our weighing of the effects of various actions on more than one individual. As a matter of fact there are no documented cases of patients refusing a test when a health care worker has been injured but we need to know where the right path lies should this unlikely eventuality arise. Quite aside from the serious implications of HIV infection, there is also the fact that many jurisdictions will not award compensation to a worker unless that worker can provide evidence that the injury was sustained in the course of her occupation. The test should however, in accordance with our general constraints on the use of information about patients, be only revealed to the health-worker concerned (who will have taken a vow of confidentiality on entering employment). But even this is not a simple and satisfactory resolution of the problems surrounding such injuries.
If either the health care worker or the patient concerned is found to be negative for HIV antibodies, she/he may be in the 'window' period before seroconversion. Thus the worker, at least, should be tested at, perhaps, 6 weeks and 6 months er the injury to be sure that she/he has not been infected. Before this period has elapsed she/he ought to take precautions against transmitting HIV particles. Of course, for some workers such as anaesthetists, this period might overlap with further injury from an at-risk patient. The Justification for testing the patient, even without consent, is that here the rights of two individuals re potentially in conflict and the balance of judgments by reasonable patients is clearly to permit the test. It is clear that a policy of testing if a needle stick or other potentially infecting injury occurs should be clearly signalled to patients on their entry to the institution concerned. It is less clear whether a worker ought to be offered AZT (zidovudine) as a prophylaxis in case she/he has been infected, regardless of her/his test result. I think most of us would want this option, given the suggestion that AZT may well alter the evolution of HIV/AIDS. . Lastly, there are occasions when a patient who IS suspected of having AIDS is admitted with a deteriorating neurological condition such as tõ ender him incapable of giving consent. Here there IS a strong case for unconsented HIV testing. Consent is not required because whatever it shows could be of no material concern to the patient. Either the test will be positive and confirm the clinical suspicion that the acute and fulminant brain condition is irreversible. If the test is negative then, again, there is no ethical problem (indeed this IS needed to justify strenuous medical efforts tõ ake a diagnosis, which may have very different Implications from AIDS).
BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS
A~ajor exception to the general proscription agaznst imposed HIV testing is where a person Wishes to donate blood. Here the doctor has every Gillett. Ethics and HIV testing 19 right to insist that all donated blood be screened for HIV because otherwise we could cause a lethal harm to the recipient. If the potential blood donor is told that his blood will be tested for HIV and that he can be told the result if he wishes to know it, then he has every chance to avoid an unwanted test by withdrawing his offer to donate blood. Obviously a patient who refuses the test should not be used as a blood donor even though some patients may regard this as discriminatory against a group who may want to participate in what they consider a valued enterprise. Of course, the patient, again, should be told the significance of HIV testing if he elects to be told his result.
EPIDEMIOLOGY
The other case where there is pressure to perform HIV tests without consent is for the purposes of epidemiological research or monitoring. The ethical requirement for consent for HIV testing and the hesitancy of many of those at-risk about knowing whether or not they are affected together make good epidemiological work on HIV infection and AIDS almost impossible. Good epidemiology is, of course, a vital tool in controlling AIDS12. To do good epidemiological studies in this area, one requires blood samples from people not known or suspected of having HIV infection or AIDS and that depends on obtaining consent to a blood test which could potentially reveal one's HIV status. It appears that we cannot avoid infringing ethical principles if we screen people for HIV antibodies without their consent but that we cannot get good epidemiological data if we insist on consent because of the high incidence of positivity amongst refusers". But clear thinking about the ethical constraints on HIV testing and the justification for consent and confidentiality resolves this problemlv". The harm for patient A arises from the fact that he has a positive HIV test. But what the researcher wants is a measure of how many unidentified and unnamed human beings are HIV positive. Thus there is no conflict. Any sample obtained from A need not be identifiable as being from A. The ethical problems can therefore be 'finessed'. There is no invasion of A's privacy nor is there a potential harm to A, because nothing is known which can be traced to A. (An easy method of avoiding duplication of tests could involve testing patients only on their first visit to the hospital after commencing the survey.) In this way the scientifically useful knowledge that X% of patients in the community are HIV positive could be gained without infringing on patients' rights or extracting ethically problematic knowledge about any given individual. The knowledge about A which we found reason to surround with norms of consent and confidentiality would not exist to be notified to or withheld from anybody including A himself.
If this recommendation were put into practice it would be true that blood from patients would have been used for research but the lack of special ethical problems allow a very general and non-informative form of consent to suffice, e.g. that the patient consents to-some of his blood being used anonymously for research. The results would not be of any material concern to a reasonable patient except as a member of the community and thus individual consent is unnecessary. Therefore, there are no ethical problems with epidemiological research into HIV and AIDS provided that the results cannot conceivably yield information about any individual patient involved.
This conclusion has, however, prompted objections from doctors who have asked what they ought to do if they found, say, that one of a thousand patients tested was HIV positive. Could such a doctor, in all conscience, let this individual go undetected and endanger other potential patients within the community? Must we not, therefore, be able to trace the sample and through it the affected individual? The arguments above resolve this issue.
First, we have not sought permission to gain knowledge about the HIV status of an individual patient and we must seek express permission where we want to discover that. Second, the population is not at the same kind of risk as with other infectious diseases and therefore does not need protecting. Third, we have served a research interest which has given us knowledge that we did not have and that may ultimately benefit the whole community. If, as a result of such an exercise we feel that a group ought to be tested to see which individuals are HIV positive then we must ask each individual we propose to test as to whether he or she will agree. Some may decline and we might fail to find the affected individual. We would then be no worse off and as researchers and scientists (and members of our community) much better off than we would have been anyway. Also we have avoided contravening the requirements of ethical medicine. But we might have to live with the fact that among a thousand people we have tested one untracable person is HIV positive.
In any event the need for consent for HIV testing does not undermine epidemiological work provided certain ethical safeguards are met. The major constraints are (i) we cannot modify anonymous testing so as it amounts to unconsented testing of patients as individuals and (ii) we cannot gain such individual information without attention to the strict conditions under which, alone, consent is not required.
CONFIDENTIALITY
There are certain situations where a positive HIV result on one person is directly relevant to the welfare of another. Most of the time patients are responsible about the welfare of others and agree to such sharing of information. But the possibility exists that the doctor will be forced into an unenviable choice between respect for the confidentiality of patient information and his duty to safeguard the other person who is at risk. There seem to be two occasions on which the doctor is put in this position. The first is where he has referred the patient to a colleague for further management (eg surgery). In this case, not only is the patient's HIV status relevant to the welfare of the surgeon for reasons already discussed but also a full knowledge of medical facts about a patient is essential to proper management of a condition. One can easily imagine a scenario where knowing that the patient was at risk from AIDS would alter treatment, perhaps, for instance, steroids or irnrnuno-suppressive treatment might be contraindicated as surgical adjuncts.
The second situation involves the sexual partner of an HIV infected patient. Here the doctor has an obligation to the at-risk person which tends to counter the respect for confidentialityl", An ethical resolution of our dilemma would seem to hinge on two considerations: (i) we are sworn to keep our patients and those whose path crosses us from harm where we can do so; and (ii)the infected patient has himself betrayed the value system on which a commitment to confidentiality is built and therefore is holding a morally untenable position. It is clear that there is a great harm potentially in store for the unsuspecting and deceived partner. But there are also harms in the breach of personal confidences and in the wider threat that'other people with AIDs will be more reluctant to corne forward'F if the doctor acts this way. The latter harm is, however, unlikely because the situation is unusual and there are powerful reasons for an at-risk person to seek professional advice. Quite apart from this, the moral duplicity which is asked of the doctor ie that she (passively) abet the patient in exposing an innocent person to mortal harm, is unreasonable. Our duties can require us to act with respect and consideration but not to act immorally in complicity with someone who draws on a set of value commitments in considering his own interests but rejects them as they apply to a person for whom he is supposed to care. However, I must stress that the only basis on which the doctor is justified is the demonstrable and significant risk to the other person (thus we are not justified in informing employers, associates or 'interested' parties except where this exists). It is of interest that this stand accords with the opinion of the General Medical Council (GMC) on the issue".
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
The legal framework within which HIV testing would be evaluated is quite unclear and based on analogies with other situations.
In general, a doctor is justified in performing any tests required to make a diagnosis of the condition with which a patient presents. If the doctor has reason to believe the patient has AIDS then she is entitled, in Britain, to perform an HIV test although it is unclear what constraints would be put on doctors by this extension of s. 35 of the Public Health Act which relates to infectious diseases and has not yet been applied to AIDSI0. In British and Commonwealth countries the tests which could justifiably be performed on any patient and the information given to the patient would be determined in a legal setting by 'the Bolam test': 'a doctor must show that his conduct conforms with the professional practice of a body of responsible medical opinion'P. In relation to HIV testing that 'responsible medical opinion' is made quite clear by the GMC, ' The Council believes that the need to obtain consent should obtain generally but that it is particularly important in testing for HlV infection . . . because of the possible serious social and financial consequences which may ensue for the patient from the mere fact of having been tested for the condition. ,1 The only exceptions allowed are 'where a test is imperative to secure the safety of persons other than the patient, and where it is not possible for the prior consent of the patient". These exceptions are, however, not as clear from a legal point of view 'if the test is carried out for the purpose of informing the doctor, out of concern for his, or others' interests rather than the patient's, Bolam would not apply'10. Kennedy believes that this follows from the fact that therapeutic privilege is normally predicated on the basis of benefit to the patient and that, for instance, research is not looked at in this light. It should, however, be clear that the situation envisaged is quite different in kind from research and from that which obtains in other infective diseases. We arẽ ticipating a potentially lethal harm befalling an Identifiable person who has a legitimate claim on a~y medical person suitably placed to help her. For this reason I cannot agree with Kennedy and have argued for the stand taken by the GMC.
My conclusion in this and other cases would be that there are almost no circumstances where a doctor may legitimately gain or share the knowledge tha~a particular patient is HIV positive without that patient's explicit consent. I believe that there would be a close run case in law if that decision were to impinge on the health of another person such as a spouse or health-care worker and that the GMC position would probably be taken as constituting re~ponsible medical opinion' for legal purposes. EpIdemiological work is exempt from these constraints only if it is done in such a way that the Gillett. Ethics and HIV testing 21 patient cannot be identified' from the sample given and thus that there is a genuine and absolute anonymity attached to the test result. But the legal aspects of these issues still remain to be resolved and we can only hope that careful ethical reasoning is duly regarded by any body adjudicating them.
